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7Import Substitution Industrialization
and the Development of Indigenous
Enterprises
As Mexico’s industrialization progressed, the leading industries changed from
consumer goods to intermediate goods and then on to capital and durable
consumer goods. The six cases of indigenous enterprises examined in this
book have been the companies at the forefront of the leading industries at
each stage. Following the time periods presented in the Introduction that
mark the stages of Mexico’s industrialization, the consumer goods industry
played the leading role during the first period from 1890 to 1940, and the
beer brewer Cuauhtémoc and the bread manufacturer Bimbo belong to the
enterprises which arose in this period. The second period from 1940 to 1953
marked the shift to the intermediate goods industry, and Fundidora and Hylsa
belong to the enterprises of this period. The third period from 1953 to 1962
saw a shift toward the production of capital goods as well, and Grupo México
in the nonferrous metal mining industry belongs to the enterprises of this
period. The autoparts maker Spicer belongs to the fourth period from 1962 to
1982 during which the capital goods and durable consumer goods industries
became the leading industrial sectors. All of these enterprises established
their dominant positions in their respective industries during the period of
import substitution industrialization, and with the exception of Fundidora,
they still continue to dominate their industries, even as Mexico has progressed
with market liberalization. Why were these enterprises able to enter the lead-
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ing industries of each stage and grow into the dominant enterprises of their
industries? The analysis in this study indicates that the main factors making
such entry and growth possible were the innovativeness of these enterprises
along with the supportive policies pursued by the government.
Enterprise Innovativeness
In the Introduction, this author defined the innovativeness of enterprises as
the ability of enterprises to correctly understand the requisites of growth,
then to resolutely take up the challenge of new ventures in order to prepare
the way for growth, then finally to realize growth; and this ability is embod-
ied in the technological, productive, and marketing capabilities of an enter-
prise. For the enterprises in this study, the requisites of growth were very
much determined by the characteristics of the industries they operated in and
by the conditions of Mexico’s industrial development. The beer brewing and
bread manufacturing industries, for example, have common characteristics.
The technology is standardized, companies have to build up extensive net-
works for procuring raw materials and selling products, and they can build
up brand loyalty amongst customers through advertising and product promo-
tion. Technologically the impediments to new entrants are low which means
it is quite easy for indigenous enterprises to set up in these two industries,
and these enterprises have the advantage over foreign companies when es-
tablishing networks with customers and raw material suppliers. The requi-
sites for enterprise growth in industries which have these characteristics are:
decreasing costs, increasing quality, diversifying products by introducing
advanced technology, establishing wide-ranging networks to assure the stable
procurement of raw materials and the sale of goods, and cultivating the loy-
alty of clients through vigorous advertising and product promotion activi-
ties. Cuauhtémoc and Bimbo both incorporated these requisites into their
business strategies, and by doing so, both companies became “first movers”
who quickly secured their dominant positions in their respective industries.
At the same time, the ability of both companies to carry out their corporate
strategies depended on the progress of Mexico’s industrialization. The lack
of development of the raw materials sector led Cuauhtémoc to internalize
raw material production. Meanwhile the changes in people’s life style, the
growth of the country’s road network, and the spread of mass media that
came along with industrial development stimulated the expansion of the do-
mestic market and prepared the way for expanding sales networks and un-
dertaking mass advertising which were major factors for the growth of both
companies.
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In the steel, nonferrous metal mining, and autoparts industries, the notable
feature was the impediments facing indigenous enterprises that tried to enter
these industries through their own efforts. One was the huge amount of capi-
tal needed to enter and to compete in these industries. In the steel industry at
the start of Mexico’s industrialization, indigenous enterprises like Fundidora
could be primary players in developing the industry, but already by the 1940s,
the industry’s technological innovations and expanding scale of operations
called for enormous outlays of capital, and it became difficult for private
enterprise alone to sustain the development of the industry. AHMSA, which
had started as a private business, was taken over by the government. Even
Fundidora, which was established as a public enterprise, found one of its
major problems to be the procurement of funds. Hylsa, however, was an
exception. It was able to develop through its own efforts because of support
from Cuauhtémoc. In the nonferrous metal mining industry and the autoparts
industry, in addition to the need for huge amounts of capital, there were two
other barriers: the high level of technology and the preponderance of power
that foreign-owned companies had in the domestic market. By the start of the
twentieth century, American companies already dominated nonferrous metal
mining, and in the autoparts industry foreign companies monopolized the
technology and markets. For indigenous enterprises to enter these industries,
a mechanism was needed to overcome the impediments to entry. This mecha-
nism was provided by the government which, in the case of the mining in-
dustry, was the government’s indigenization policy, while for the autoparts
industry, it was the government’s industrial promotion policies.
The Role of the Government
During the period of import substitution industrialization, the Mexican gov-
ernment actively intervened to promote industrial development through such
measures as tariff and import licensing systems, preferential tax treatment
and financial subsidies, investment in infrastructure, establishment of public
enterprises, and restrictions on foreign capital investment. The government
also directly and indirectly supported the growth of indigenous enterprises
through its efforts to protect and foster domestic industries, promote invest-
ment, and overcome bottlenecks in the economy (Hansen 1971, pp. 44–55;
Story 1990, pp. 73–74). The nonferrous metal mining industry and the
autoparts industry are the two most outstanding examples that demonstrate
the importance of government intervention and support in promoting the
growth of indigenous enterprises.
The policy to indigenize the mining industry was adopted because the
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domination of foreign companies hampered the government’s ultimate ob-
jective of reviving the industry. Following indigenization, Grupo México
and other indigenized enterprises vigorously expanded investment which
raised productivity and ultimately led to the revival of the mining industry.
With its policy to promote the automobile industry, the government imposed
various restrictions on foreign-owned auto assembly companies in order to
induce them to foster indigenous autoparts manufacturers. Technological and
market deficiencies were overcome with the cooperation of foreign firms,
and the autoparts industry developed into a sector dominated by indigenous
enterprises.
The policy indigenizing the mining industry and that to promote the auto-
mobile industry were both basically policies to restrict foreign participation
in the industries, and in both cases these policies were effective in fostering
indigenous enterprises. However, policies to restrict foreign participation are
not always effective, and as shown in this study, certain conditions are neces-
sary for such policies to be effective. One condition is that the government
hold an advantageous position in negotiations with foreign enterprises. For
the Mexican government, in the nonferrous metal mining industry, it was the
inherent feature of the industry that once investment had been made in mines
and other fixed facilities, this capital could not flee overseas. In the autoparts
manufacturing industry, it was the existence of an expanding domestic mar-
ket.
A second condition is finding effective ways of surmounting the barriers
inhibiting the market, technology, and financing. In the nonferrous metal
mining industry, the policy of allowing minority foreign ownership made it
possible for indigenous enterprises to achieve gradually self-reliance in mar-
keting and technology. At the same time, Mexico’s expanding domestic mar-
ket and diminishing ability of major multinational mining companies to domi-
nate the market, provoked by the heightened nationalist feeling in developing
countries to keep control of the nation’s natural resources in their hands,
made it easier to resolve market problems. In autoparts manufacturing the
government took up the fostering of indigenous enterprises, and problems
connected with the market were solved by securing the cooperation of for-
eign-owned automobile assembly companies, while problems with technol-
ogy were overcome through the capital participation of foreign-owned
autoparts makers promoted by the intermediation of assembly companies.
For financial resources, indigenous enterprises could procure the needed capi-
tal from accumulated profits, through overseas borrowing which was secured
on the basis of creditworthiness as profitable and growing enterprises, and/or
on the basis of their good relations with foreign-owned firms.
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A third condition, that was obtaining for Mexico but is lacking today, is
the existence of an international environment that is tolerant toward restric-
tions on foreign capital. The indigenization of the mining industry and pro-
moting of the automobile industry were both begun by the López Mateos
government. His presidency overlapped exactly with that of the Cuban revo-
lution, and the international environment due to the prevailing cold war was
tolerant of nationalistic economic policies.
A fourth condition is the existence of receptive entrepreneurial talent that
can respond effectively to the government’s policies. Two of the industries
examined in this study, nonferrous metal mining and autoparts manufactur-
ing, showed that the existence of indigenous entrepreneurs who could step
into the gap created by restrictions on foreign firms was an important factor
for the growth of indigenous enterprises. Entrepreneurs who entered these
two industries were ones who in the course of Mexico’s industrialization had
been able to accumulate capital and business experience, and who had the
desire to venture into new fields of business. However, the number of such
entrepreneurs was limited, and they lacked sufficient financial resources to
venture into new businesses on their own. To overcome this financial insuf-
ficiency, other indigenous investors were invited in to participate in the new
ventures. When no entrepreneurs came forward to carry out the government’s
policies, such as in the case of Cananea, the government itself took up the
task of managing the enterprises. The reason the government moved into the
mining industry after indigenization took place was to supplement weak indig-
enous private capital. Then thirty years after implementing its indigenization
policy, the government introduced privatization and handed Cananea over to
Grupo México, a move that demonstrated the extent that the strength of the
private sector had grown over the three decades. Seen from the perspective
of the fourth condition, it becomes evident that the period before World War
II, which has not attracted much scholarly attention, was extremely impor-
tant in Mexico’s process of industrialization. The volume of production dur-
ing this period was not so large, nor was the rate of growth; but what was
very important during this period was the accumulation of indigenous capi-
tal and human resources which supported Mexico’s later industrial growth.
But while government economic intervention, especially in industries where
technological, capital, and market impediments to entry were high, played a
major role in supporting the growth of indigenous enterprises, there were
also negative effects. These included the growth of a dependence on govern-
ment support, as exemplified by Fundidora in the steel industry, and the un-
fairness for private companies which had to compete against public corpora-
tions that could rely on public funds and government procurements.
CHAPTER 7120
Oligopolization and Division of Spheres of Activity
The analysis of the five industries examined in this study reveals why some
enterprises in certain industries grow into oligopolistic enterprises. This means
that when looking at Mexico’s economy, the analysis of the five industries
has the capacity to explain the main features of the national economy, such
as the oligopolistic industrial structure and the division of spheres of busi-
ness activity for indigenous, foreign-owned, and public enterprises.1 Look-
ing at the problem of the mutually conditioning behavior at work between
enterprise growth and Mexico’s industrialization process, I would like to seek
out the logic for oligopolization and for the division of the spheres of enter-
prise activity by placing within the industrialization process the five indus-
tries examined in this study.
In a classic work discussing industrialization in late-industrializing coun-
tries, Alexander Gerschenkron stated that the rapid pace of industrializing
and the appearance of giant enterprises right from the early stages were char-
acteristics of industrialization in these countries because it was possible for
these countries to take advantage of technological innovations made in the
advanced countries (Gerschenkron 1952, pp. 6–8). If this argument is ac-
cepted however, it would mean that developing countries are fated to have
oligopolistic industrial structures. But the fact is that not all of the industries
of these countries are dominated by huge oligopolistic enterprises.
Chandler has provided an instructive argument, cited in Chapter 4, for
explaining the types of industries in which giant enterprises arise. In his analy-
sis he argues that the development of new systems of transportation and com-
munications and the innovations in the technology of production that took
place starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century allowed industries
to enjoy unprecedented economies of scale and scope. The result in the ad-
vanced capitalist countries was that enterprises that undertook large-scale
three-pronged investment in production, distribution, and management be-
came first movers in their respective industries and jumped ahead of the com-
petition, thereby assuming dominant positions in their industries. These en-
terprises continued to grow by expanding their business activities through
horizontal and vertical integration, expanding into other regions, and devel-
oping new products. Chandler supports his argument with analyses of case
studies. The potential for acquiring economies of scale and scope differs ac-
cording to industry, and giant oligopolistic enterprises do not come forth in
every industry. According to Chandler, such enterprises emerge most promi-
nently in capital-intensive industries like foods, chemicals, petroleum, pri-
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mary metals, machinery, electric equipment, and transport equipment. On
the other hand, such enterprises have not arisen in industries like printing
and publishing, lumber, furniture, textiles made from natural fibers, apparel,
leather, specialized instruments and machinery, and seasonal and specialized
food processing. This is because enterprises in these industries for the most
part have not had the incentives for three-pronged investment in production,
distribution, and management because of the characteristics of the technol-
ogy which is used (Chandler 1990, pp. 8–45).
In Mexico the separation of capital-intensive and labor-intensive indus-
tries very often corresponds to the separation between industries where for-
eign-owned or indigenous enterprises are dominant. If we follow Chandler’s
view, the reason that indigenous enterprises have come to dominate labor-
intensive industries is because multinational enterprises cannot demonstrate
their superiority in these industries even while adhering to the three-pronged
investment approach. This makes it possible for indigenous enterprises to
compete. But the reason even goes back to the home countries of the multi-
nationals where labor-intensive industries have likewise provided little scope
for the emergence of large-scale enterprises which are capable of operating
overseas.
But labor-intensive industries are not the concern here as all of the indus-
tries examined in this study are capital-intensive and have economies of scale
and scope. Also all of the enterprises analyzed were set up with the introduc-
tion of the latest technology from the advanced countries, were modern in-
dustrial enterprises right from their starts, and with the exception of Hylsa,
they succeeded as first movers to dominate their industries. Thus in accor-
dance with Chandler’s argument, there was a high probability of oligopolistic
systems forming in these industries. However, it is important to note that the
entities promoting oligopoly in these industries have been indigenous enter-
prises. As Chandler points out, if modern industrial enterprises emerge in
these industries in the advanced countries, there is a very great possibility
that these enterprises will expand overseas, meaning that in Mexico’s case
there was a great possibility that foreign firms would become active in its
capital-intensive industries, and in fact the country’s nonferrous metal min-
ing industry was developed by foreign enterprises. Given the superior posi-
tion of multinational enterprises, how can we explain the dominance of in-
digenous enterprises in certain capital-intensive industries in Mexico?
This author’s analysis provides the following explanations. Within capi-
tal-intensive industries there are some industries which are conducive to the
entry of indigenous enterprises that have the particular requisites for entry.
For the industries examined in this study, one of the features of these indus-
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tries has been relatively easy access to the latest technology. This is because
the industry’s technology has become highly standardized and/or because a
monopoly on the technology does not guarantee a competitive advantage.2
Another feature is the existence of products and markets whose particular
characteristics give indigenous enterprises a competitive advantage. For ex-
ample, the characteristics of beer and bread which are heavy and bulky or
easily damaged and which have extensive markets help these products avoid
competition from imports. If there is competition, it is from foreign enter-
prises which have acquired production bases within the country, and in the
competition among enterprises, the need to invest in distribution which char-
acterizes these industries has worked to the advantage of indigenous entre-
preneurs who are knowledgeable about the local markets. Indigenous enter-
prises can enter industries which have the above features, can compete on an
equal footing with foreign firms, and sometimes it is even possible for them
to acquire a dominant position in the industry. But this latter result is only a
possibility. To actually achieve a dominant position, an indigenous enter-
prise has to fulfill one requisite condition for a modern enterprise: undertak-
ing three-pronged investment in production, distribution, and management.
However, this requisite alone will not be enough when competing with for-
eign firms which are following the same business strategy. To secure its own
dominance, an indigenous enterprise also has to establish itself as the
industry’s “first mover” before any foreign firms have a chance to enter. This
means that the time frame when an enterprise is set up is very important.
Haber considered problematic the fact that modern enterprises set up in
Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century selected technologies that were
out of balance with the scale of the domestic market. However, the fact that
indigenous capitalists established modern industrial enterprises at an early
stage made it possible for indigenous capital to dominate certain industries
and impede the entry of foreign enterprises which was definitely important
for later industrial development. In this sense the period before World War II
had considerable importance for Mexico’s industrialization.
Turning to the capital-intensive industries where the above-discussed con-
ditions were lacking and the impediments to entry were high, how does one
explain the dominance of indigenous enterprises in these industries? One
reason, of course, was the existence of support from the government. But
this explanation alone is not sufficient because, to emphasize yet again, only
after indigenous enterprises have fulfilled the requisite condition for a mod-
ern industrial enterprise which is the three-pronged investment in produc-
tion, distribution, and management, can they take full advantage of the sup-
port being offered by the government.
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A final point I would like to add is that all of the industries analyzed in this
study are examples of ones transplanted from the advanced economies. The
significant point here is the role of immigrants and the proximity of the ad-
vanced economy of the United States. This study has pointed out numerous
entrepreneurs who were immigrants or their offspring. Also three of the six
enterprises studied have been set up in the city of Monterrey located in the
country’s northern border zone. The common features of immigrants and
border cities have been their easier access to the latest information and their
greater opportunities for developing networks linked with the advanced econo-
mies. For these reasons Mexico’s immigrants and border cities have pos-
sessed the favorable conditions needed for the task of transplanting new in-
dustries into the domestic economy.
Business Diversification
It was pointed out in the Introduction that the notable characteristic of Mexico’s
indigenous enterprises is their formation of enterprise groups which control
subsidiaries in diverse business fields. The enterprises analyzed in this study
conform to this pattern as they are either enterprise groups themselves or are
subsidiaries of enterprise groups. In this section I would like to examine how
the business diversification of indigenous enterprises is related to the growth
and maturation of Mexico’s industrialization as seen from the mutually de-
termining effect that exists between enterprise growth and the industrializa-
tion process.
From the enterprises examined in this study, there were essentially two
main factors that caused them to diversify their business activities. One was
the imperfection and instability of the markets, a characteristic of the eco-
nomic environment for enterprises operating in developing countries. The
markets in Mexico for materials of production and for manufactured prod-
ucts were imperfect and unstable. To secure stable supplies of needed mate-
rials and goods, reduce transaction costs, and secure outlets for products,
these enterprises expanded into related business sectors which enabled them
to diversify their business activities. Some of the examples of business di-
versification into upstream and downstream sectors were Cuauhtémoc’s moves
into beer bottle and bottle cap production, label printing, packaging, and steel,
Grupo México’s establishment of smelters and refineries, and Spicer’s move
into the internal production of basic materials for autoparts. There were vari-
ous reasons for diversifying: a domestic producer of the items an enterprise
needed did not exist, or if a domestic producer existed, monopolies over
supply and/or demand made transaction costs high; or importing needed items
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was hampered by the risk of exchange rate fluctuations or the disruption of
wars. These and other reasons made it much more advantageous for indig-
enous enterprises to diversity into related sectors and internalize the produc-
tion of raw and basic materials. Another factor behind the move to internal-
ize production was the severe competition among enterprises. When
competition among enterprises became fierce, as in the beer and bread manu-
facturing industries, the internal production of the raw materials they needed
for their products and development of their own distribution networks guar-
anteed their superiority over their competitors and at the same time such
internal production and distribution networks acted as barriers to the entry of
potential competitors.
A second important factor for diversifying was the existence of business
opportunities that derive from the economic circumstances of a developing
country. The economic gap between the developing countries and the ad-
vanced countries signifies for the former the existence of latent business op-
portunities. These are only latent opportunities, however. To make them ac-
tual business opportunities, there has to be a proper economic environment
and agents who can carry out these opportunities. In Mexico, the industrial-
ization process progressed so rapidly that the range of potential business
opportunities that entrepreneurs could bring within their sphere of business
activities quickly expanded within a short period of time. Some of these la-
tent opportunities were successfully exploited because the entrepreneurs them-
selves had the ingenuity and talent to turn them into successful business ac-
tivities, as was the case in the beer, bread, and steel industries. Others were
presented to the entrepreneurs as actual business opportunities, as happened
in the nonferrous metal mining industry and the autoparts industry. But
whether business opportunities were latent or actual, there was only a lim-
ited number of entrepreneurs in Mexico who were able to turn these into
actual business activities. This entrepreneurial insufficiency was readily ap-
parent in the examples of the nonferrous metal mining and autoparts indus-
tries where it was difficult to get indigenous entrepreneurs to enter these
industries even though the government was offering them actual, as opposed
to latent, business opportunities. This situation of diverse business opportu-
nities existing but only a limited number of entrepreneurs capable of meeting
the challenges of these opportunities, made it easy for a small number of
businessmen to move into a diversity of new businesses. This resulted in the
formation of enterprise groups which controlled a diversified range of busi-
nesses.
Salvador Cordero and Rafael Santín see the limitations of Mexico’s mar-
ket as one of the important factors causing indigenous enterprises to diver-
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sify their business operations. Because their products lack export competi-
tiveness, they have been limited to the domestic market. But the domestic
market is small because of the unequal distribution of income. For this rea-
son, Cordero and Santín argue that when enterprises increased their financial
strength, they developed products that largely targeted the upper income brack-
ets where they could expect to make profits, and this has made them diver-
sify their business (Cordero and Santín 1977, p. 15).
This argument that the inequality of income distribution and the limita-
tions of the market caused enterprises to diversify their business cannot be
confirmed from the five industries analyzed in this study. A rapid expansion
in the scale of existing business operations could be seen in the beer, bread,
steel, and nonferrous metal mining industries. The biggest factor for this was
the growth of domestic markets. But one cannot see in the enterprises of this
study efforts to reduce prices by increasing the scale of production, and fur-
ther expand markets. Taking the beer industry as an example, competition
took place in the areas of advertising and distribution but not in pricing; the
market was expanded although prices were not lowered. Cordero and Santín’s
argument applies to certain industries and certain stages of industrialization;
in other words, business diversification targeting the markets in the upper
income brackets took place in the durable consumer goods industries, and
the time frame for this was from the latter half of the 1960s when those
industries were leading Mexico’s industrialization which was also the stage
when indigenous enterprises were beginning to enter those industries.
Related to the above discussion, the usual explanation why enterprises did
not turn to exporting to overcome the limitations of the domestic market is
that they lacked export competitiveness. But there is another factor and that
was the difficulty of developing export markets. Mexico’s industrialization
moved ahead by transferring modern industries from the advanced countries
to the domestic economy. As industrialization moved into the later stages,
enterprises from the advanced countries began to play a larger role in the
transfer of industries, and this increasingly took the form of joint ventures
and the providing of technology. This development made it extremely diffi-
cult for the durable and capital goods industries that had been set up in Mexico
to find overseas markets because foreign enterprises that played an impor-
tant role in transferring industries in Mexico were in firm control of the mar-
kets in the advanced countries, and they also had taken over the same indus-
tries in the markets of the developing countries where they were shielded by
protectionist trade policies. For these reasons it was difficult for Mexico’s
indigenous enterprises to develop export markets through their own efforts.
But there was the possibility of exporting in cooperation with foreign-owned
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firms. This happened in the autoparts industry where exporting through the
distribution networks of foreign enterprises became a rational and realistic
choice.
It has often been pointed out that enterprise groups in developing coun-
tries have features that closely resemble those of Japan’s prewar zaibatsu
(Leff 1974, p. 522). If “zaibatsu” is defined as “diversified business opera-
tions under the exclusive control of a family or a group of related families
with the diversified businesses occupying oligopolistic positions in their re-
spective industrial sectors” (Hashimoto and others 1992, p. 3), Mexico’s en-
terprise groups closely resemble Japan’s former zaibatsu in their diversified
business operations and their oligopolistic positions in industries, but they
differ when it comes to “exclusive” control by a family or group of related
families. Among Mexico’s enterprise groups, it is not unusual for a family to
have a dominant influence over business operations, but never exclusive con-
trol. Nathaniel H. Leff states that one characteristic feature of enterprise groups
in developing countries is the gathering of funds from sources outside the
sphere of the core family, and this sphere can extend over numerous families
within the same familial group, same ethnic group, and/or same locality. The
features of enterprise groups in Mexico are close to those set forth by Leff.
The reason for the loose family control over enterprise groups in developing
countries compared with Japan’s prewar zaibatsu can be explained by the
difference in the stage of industrialization. As industrialization moves into
later stages, the intensity of capital and technology increases when introduc-
ing new industries. The scale of financing needed to enter new industries
becomes enormous making it difficult to procure funds within the same fa-
milial group. For this reason, an entrepreneur has to mobilize a far-ranging
network of human relations in order to gather the needed funds, and this
loosens the control that one family can have over an enterprise group. This
argument is supported by the fact that during the 1930s when technology-
and capital-intensive industries had become relatively predominant in Japan,
no new zaibatsu came into existence (Hashimoto and others 1992, p. 139). In
essence, the formation of enterprise groups is a phenomenon characteristic
of late-industrializing countries; Japan’s zaibatsu can be regarded as one of
the types of these enterprise groups conditioned by the stage of industrializa-
tion in which they grew up.
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Neo-liberal Economic Reforms, Enterprise Transformation, and
the Heritage of Import Substitution Industrialization
During the 1980s, Mexico’s development strategy shifted from import sub-
stitution industrialization to a neo-liberal strategy which did away with many
of the protective conditions that had supported the growth of indigenous en-
terprises during the period of import substitution industrialization. One was
the end of protection for the domestic market. With trade liberalization and
the wide-ranging reduction of controls on foreign capital, indigenous enter-
prises were forced to compete against imports and foreign enterprises that
entered the domestic market. Government intervention in the economy was
also greatly curtailed. Such changes meant that indigenous enterprises could
no longer expect to get the government financial and policy support they had
previously relied on. At the same time however, the change in development
strategy opened new possibilities for indigenous enterprises to grow. The
reduction of government intervention in the economy meant a reduction in
the sphere of business activities for public enterprises which offered splen-
did opportunities for indigenous enterprises to expand their own spheres of
business activities. Also the moves during this time to reform the financial
system and liberalize international financing opened the way for indigenous
enterprises to procure funds from international financial markets. Faced with
this double-sided change of losing their previous conditions for growth but
with new opportunities for growth emerging, many indigenous enterprises
moved beyond the domestic market and ventured into overseas markets, en-
deavoring to strengthen their competitiveness by restructuring their business
operations and forming strategic alliances with foreign companies. In recent
years these developments have raised the level of exports for Mexican enter-
prises and increased their overseas production. Looking at some examples of
the enterprises examined in this study, Cuauhtémoc expanded its distribution
network abroad by means of a strategic alliance with the Canadian brewer
Labatt and increased its exports. Hylsa has increased the ratio of its sales
coming from exports by selling products and technology overseas. Bimbo
has carried out foreign direct investment in the United States and Central and
South America which has put it at the forefront of indigenous enterprises in
the area of multinationalization. Grupo México acquired stock in Asarco of
the United States in 1999 which means that a former subsidiary has now
purchased the parent company. Spicer has turned itself into an exporter by
further strengthening its relations with overseas automobile and autoparts
companies. The reasons such enterprise transformations were possible were
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firstly because such changes were imperative for the survival and develop-
ment of the enterprises. But equally importantly, the conditions for such trans-
formations were already prepared within the enterprises themselves. These
conditions included: a high level of production and technological capacity
and ability to cultivate markets; the international creditworthiness that arises
from these capabilities cultivated through years of experience; and the inter-
national business networks and relations the enterprises have developed. These
capabilities had been formed during the period of import substitution indus-
trialization and became important assets that helped these enterprises carry
out their neo-liberal transformation.
The three fundamental characteristics of indigenous enterprises in Mexico
that have been emphasized in this study are the oligopolistic domination of
the market, the development of diversified business operations, and their
concentration in particular industries. The question now is how these three
characteristics will change now that the protected domestic market and gov-
ernment support, the two conditions for enterprise growth during the period
of import substitution industrialization, have disappeared. Can large-scale
indigenous enterprises maintain the monopolistic domination of their mar-
kets? How will indigenous enterprises and foreign firms share their particu-
lar spheres of business activity as public enterprises disappear and the economy
shifts from an industrialization process regulated by government authority to
one controlled by market principles? These and other questions are of great
interest, but their examination lies beyond the range of the present study.
They remain to be answered in future research together with empirical stud-
ies on the adaptation of Mexico’s indigenous enterprises to a neo-liberal
economy.
Notes
1 Concerning the oligopolization of the economy and the division of spheres of
business activity, the 1970s are detailed in Fajnzylber and Martínez Tarrago
(1976) and Sepúlveda and Chumacero (1973); for the 1980s, see Casar and
others (1990).
2 Chandler has pointed out that in the U.S. steel industry, pioneer enterprises pro-
moted the commercialization of technology and that the role of technological
development in competition was small. In the case of easily damaged goods
like bread and beer, he notes that an enterprise maintains its competitiveness
through investment in distribution rather than in production (Chandler 1990,
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pp. 127, 139, 166). Rather than monopolize technological innovations and deny
their use to other companies, enterprises in these industries prefer to commer-
cialize the innovations and reap the resulting benefits.
